Assumptions of Randomness in Cosmology Models by Levin, Leonid A.
Assumptions of Randomness in Cosmology Models
Leonid A. Levin
Boston University\ast 
Abstract
Non-compact symmetries cannot be fully broken by randomness since non-compact
Lie groups have no invariant probability distributions. In particular, this makes trickier
the ``Copernican"" random choice of the place of the observer in infinite cosmology models.
Physics laws allow all sorts of events and histories. In infinite cosmology models each one of them rolls out
infinitely often: weirdest miracles are daily routine in some places. To understand our boring world one must
assume our place is rather generic. So, theories assume some events happen at random, others are derived
from them by physical equations or other algorithms. In fact, [Ku\v cera 85, G\'acs 86] prove that any sequence is
computable from an algorithmically random one.1 However, the theories of this type can only be complete if
they specify which exactly are the random events and what is their probability distribution. These events need
not be directly observable, rather just be a part of the model from which the observations are derived.
But the specification of this set of ``external"" events (not meant to be derived in the model, but rather
assumed random) is often glossed over. Someone like Laplace, or another classical deist, might assume this
to be the set of positions and speeds of all particles at the initial state of the Universe. The Creator would
set them up, then retire, leaving the rest to the equations of physics. But this choice is quite arbitrary. The
Creator could as easily set up the final state of the Universe at random. (As all equations known to Laplace
were time-reversible.) Then the initial state would be very non-random! Even more elegant would be to set
externally both initial and final positions of particles (and those on borders, if any), but no speeds. After all,
the positions of a thrown stone at two moments of time, determine its trajectory in-between. Different choices
of events designated as external, and assumed random, lead to quite different predictions.
The model also needs to describe what is a legitimate set of observations, which includes specifying the
observer (say, the humanity with its followers). Some models have the Universe as a whole in a pure state, any
perceived entropy is due to the whole being unobservable: any specific observer can see only a part, which is
in a mixed state. Then the choice of the observer is actually the source of the randomness. While the theory
may be largely indifferent to the choice of a specific observer, it may be impossible to formulate without such
a choice: remote observers cannot communicate and combine their experiences. The choice of the observer is
as much a part of a complete model, as is the choice of state of the rest of the universe.
A technical difficulty comes up here. While, the observable part of the world is finite, many models
include it in a greater infinite realm, beyond our reach. How to choose our (observer's) place in this realm at
random is puzzling. Say, in a most primitive setting, how to choose a random point in a pattern on an infinite
Euclidean space? There is no uniform probability distribution there. (In other models, where ours is one of
the infinitely many ``bubbles,"" it may be even much trickier.) A way around this technicality can lie in the
reverse order of choices. Instead of first building an infinite universe and then choosing the place of the observer
there, we can do the opposite: first designate the observer, then build an infinite universe around her. This
circumvents the lack of uniform distributions in infinite domains (and tickles our ego, besides :-).
This brings up a question, what is an observer? Its many meanings depend on what symmetries are meant
to be broken by choosing this sort of a ``gauge"". In quantum physics observer can mean a macroscopic system
brought into an entanglement with the observed microscopic variables. ``Macroscopic"" is a vague term with
unclear relevance. Sometimes it is put in relation with the Plank mass (e.g., by R.Penrose). But it is unclear
why a microscopic bacteria, much lighter than Plank mass, cannot perfectly serve as an observer. (It could
transmit its observed data to its descendants, which may include members of Royal Society. :-)
\ast Computer Science dept., 111 Cummington Mall, Boston, MA 02215. Home page: http://www.cs.bu.edu/fac/Lnd/
1Algorithmic randomness (see: [Kolmogorov 65, Kolmogorov, Uspenskii 87]) of a digital sequence \omega does not quite assure it
obeys all probability 1 math laws (only computable ones). Yet, it assures (see: [Levin 84]) that \omega either obeys all such laws or has
an infinite information about some uncomputable but mathematically definable object. The latter case would be really weird. There
are no ways for such \omega to be generated; see this informational version of Church-Turing Thesis discussed at the end of [Levin 13].
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What seems relevant here, is that the observed data, unlike generic quantum states, can be reliably copied,
preserved, transmitted, etc. For this an observer needs some sophistication, access to mechanisms for error-
correction, self-preservation, etc.2 Such features are readily present in life.
Our world is in a state that harbors life, however mysterious is life's origin. The present living creatures
developed by evolution. But for evolution even to start, it needs systems fully capable of copying themselves,
along with accumulated random mutations. The first such systems could not be produced by evolution, so
must appear spontaneously. The minimal complexity C of such systems may be significant, and the chance P
of their spontaneous generation too tiny: 1/P , exponential in C, exceeding cosmological scales.
If so, how to deal with these tiny probabilities? It may be that the laws of physics are fine-tuned to boost
them.3 But it may be that this fine-tuning requires high complexity of such fine-tuned laws, which just transfers
the tiny probability issue from live systems to laws of physics. However, the mystery seems to soften with the
abovementioned priority of choosing the observer. If models start with choosing an observer (and then building
a universe around it) then the worlds with no observers are excluded before computing the probabilities.
Such settings may also help with another issue. Some fundamental laws of physics seem to yield paradoxes
or even conflict with each other. But it may suffice for our needs if the laws are only approximately sound.
For instance, the observer cannot be absolutely reliable. It may spontaneously tunnel into something entirely
different, albeit with an exponentially small probability. A theory may be clear if such effects are ignored,
assuming the observer behaves ``as advertised"". And it may be O.K. for the theory to become incomprehensible
if negligible likelihoods, such as, e.g., observer's drastic tunneling, must be accounted for.
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2requiring free energy flow: thus gravity, as its ultimate source, may play a role for observers, even if not via Plank mass.
3I avoid the popular but unclear term ``Anthropic principle."" (As was said ``To discover a land means to look upon it with the
eyes of a European, preferably British."" Is fluent English required for being fully Anthropic? :-) I assume for observers only the
seemingly relevant abovementioned ``copyright"" for observed data. I even ignore another frequently assumed aspect -- the free will.
Stretching the relevance, let me at least explain how I understand the free will. Physics equations generate the world from some
random variables. Observations change their original probability distribution, conditioning it on the observed knowledge. (Obser-
vations reveal only some complicated derivative restrictions on the original, not directly observed, random variables. This makes
guessing our environment in some useful ways tricky: we use ``Occam Razor,"" analogies, etc., instead of computing probabilities
directly.) We model some systems describing their behavior or a probability distribution under which that behavior is random.
An impossibility of having an adequate model of a system is expressed as its free will. A modeling entity needs to exceed the
modeled one in complexity, so cannot model itself, must accept its own free will. And free will is ``contagious"": extends to anything
interacting with a free-willed entity.
As an example of free will subtlety let me bring Hillel's Golden Rule (expect yourself to be treated the way you treat others). It
can be promoted by effective systems of justice (expensive and tricky to design) that reveal, judge, and reciprocate what we do to
each other. It can also be promoted by a PR-induced faith that such a system exists, working in some mysterious way. But PR
and mysteries, overused for corrupt purposes, meet widespread skepticism nowadays which impairs that approach. The meaning of
free will clarifies another approach. Observing my own unpredictable actions, I learn more about myself. I interact with fellow
humans who share with me origins, environment, and many qualities. Thus learning about myself, I indirectly learn about them,
too. This knowledge changes the probability distribution on my environment. For instance, my kind or wicked acts, besides their
immediate effects, reveal to me more aspects of human nature, of which mine is the most intimately visible example. This subtle
``two-way street"" effect of our free will (on human nature we get to expect) sheds some light on the faith in the Golden Rule.
